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This paper examines firm entry and survival in exporting, 
and in products and markets not previously served by 
any domestic exporters. The authors use data on the 
nontraditional agriculture sector in Peru, which grew 
seven-fold from 1994 to 2007. They find tremendous 
firm entry and exit in the export sector, with exits more 
likely after one year and among firms that start small. 
There is also significant entry and exit in new markets. In 
contrast, such trial and error in new products is rare. New 
products are typically discovered by large experienced 
exporters and there is increased entry after products are 
This paper—a product of the Trade and Integration Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort in 
the department to understand export growth. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.
worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at cfreund@worldbank.org and mpierola@worldbank.org.  
discovered. The results imply that high sunk costs of 
entry are of concern for product discovery, especially 
for products that are not consumed domestically. In 
contrast, the tremendous entry and exit in exporting 
and in new markets suggests that initial sunk costs are 
relatively low. The authors develop a model that explains 
how entrepreneurs decide to export and to develop new 
export products and markets when there are sunk costs of 
discovery and uncertainty about idiosyncratic costs. The 
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I. Introduction 
 
Recent empirical work highlights high rates of entry and exit into exporting, and 
explores the way in which exporters access foreign markets.
1  While the standard 
heterogeneous-firm model (Melitz 2003) does an excellent job of explaining empirical 
findings on exporters’ characteristics,
2 it is less equipped to explain these entry and exit 
patterns and how foreign markets are accessed.  It uses comparative statics to explain 
entry and exit, and as a result, it cannot explain why a firm would enter and then 
immediately exit exporting with no change in trade costs, as is observed frequently.  It 
also cannot explain how firms develop new products or enter new markets. Studying 
these factors is important, especially in dynamic sectors, where these entries account for a 
large share of export growth.  
  In this paper, we explore the role of idiosyncratic uncertainty and sunk entry costs 
in explaining why many firms enter the export sector and then exit almost immediately.  
We also examine entry and exit into new products and markets, and describe 
characteristics of the pioneers.  While some of our results are consistent with earlier 
work, our contribution is to uncover precisely why entry and exit in exporting is so 
                                                 
1 Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) examine French data and find that most firms sell to only one market, 
typically the most popular one; while some firms that export widely serve the less popular markets.  Eaton 
et al. (2008) examine data from Colombia and find extremely high entry and exit rates into exporting—total 
entrants in a given year exceed the number of continuing firms and most entrants exit after one year.  
Alvarez and Lopez (2008) use data from Chile and also find high rates of entry and exit. Volpe Martincus 
and Carballo (2008) examine exports from Peru from 2001 to 2005 and find that large firms export more 
products to more markets.  Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) examine data from Mexico from 1994-2003 and 
find that new exporters tend to start small and that there is a lot of churning of products within firms. 
2 A number of studies find that exporting firms are bigger, more productive, pay higher wages and offer 
better working conditions than otherwise similar import-competing firms. Bernard and Jensen (1995) report 
detailed statistics for the United States.  A number of papers followed their approach and find similar 
results in both developing and developed economies.  Shank, Schnabel and Wagner (2007) provide a 
summary of these papers, and offer similar evidence for Germany. Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott 
(2008) also provide a summary.   3
common and identify stylized facts about new product and market development within a 
dynamic industry.
  
Using exporter-level international transactions data, we focus on the 
nontraditional agricultural sector in Peru, which grew more than 700 percent from 1994 
to 2007 (compared with 450 percent for traditional agriculture).
3 Entry of new firms and 
expansion into new products and markets was an important part of the story.  
Specifically, exporters that began exporting after 1994 account for nearly three-quarters 
of total exports in 2007.  Similarly, exports of products new to the country and entry into 
new markets for existing products together account for almost a third of total exports at 
the end of the sample period.   
We have three main findings about the way firms access markets abroad: (i) 
Firms start exporting with small trials and there is significant entry, exit, and reentry, 
implying that entry into exporting does not entail large initial fixed costs.  (ii) Entry into 
new markets (for an existing export product) is more cumbersome, but the amount of trial 
and error suggests that entry costs are still not so large as to prohibit new markets from 
being discovered.  And (iii) there are fewer trials in new goods, pioneers are typically 
relatively large exporters that are more successful than followers, and there is herding 
following product discovery.  This suggests that finding new export products is more 
costly and that many new (and profitable) products may not be discovered because of 
high sunk costs.   
Interestingly, many of the new export products are not consumed domestically—
they are produced only for foreign consumption. This is a common pattern in developing 
                                                 
3 Official numbers from the Central Bank of Peru.   4
countries,
4 which cannot be explained by firms exporting products that they are most 
efficient at producing for the home market.  Exporting such products must involve 
discovery.  We therefore also explore the distinguishing characteristics of firms that 
develop these “untasted” products. 
  We develop a model that generates entry and exit as a form of trial and error.  We 
extend the model to the case of new products and markets, where discovery costs are 
likely to be relatively large.  Specifically, entrepreneurs first decide whether to enter the 
export sector, and then whether to continue exporting, and finally whether to develop 
new products that have not been exported previously by any firm (or similarly to access 
markets new to a specific product).  Prior to entry, each exporter faces uncertainty about 
their cost of exporting a particular product, and once they export the cost is revealed.  The 
uncertainty generates significant entry and exit—some entrepreneurs with a negative 
expected value of entry will attempt to export, and if their cost draw is bad they will exit.  
The intuition is that there is a lifetime value of getting a good cost draw and only a one-
period negative shock from a bad draw.  This implies that the present value from 
attempting exports can be positive even if the one-period expected gain is negative.  It 
also means that with sunk costs of entry, there can still be significant entry and exit.  We 
show that if small trials are possible, the range of firms which attempt exporting expands. 
In addition to entering existing markets and products, exporters can also start 
product lines that are new to the country (or enter markets that are new to the product 
line).  Such development is relatively costly because the firm must develop a new product 
                                                 
4 For example, cut flowers in Kenya, coffee in Rwanda, semiconductors in Costa Rica, and flat screen TVs 
in China.  Countries are increasingly setting up special programs such as export processing zones to 
encourage such production.  There are now 60 million people working in 3,500 export processing zones 
spanning 130 countries producing clothes, shoes, sneakers, electronics, and toys for export (Boyenge 
2007).     5
or meet new market requirements.  The model shows that the quality of the pioneers in 
new products (and markets) is increasing in the cost of discovery.  As a result, these 
entrepreneurs are less likely than followers to cease exporting these products after entry.   
Several other recent papers focus on related issues.  Segura-Cayuela and 
Vilarrubia (2008) and Eaton et al. (2009) incorporate uncertainty that is alleviated as 
firms learn about a market.  In Eaton et al. the uncertainty is firm specific while in 
Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia uncertainty about a market is reduced as more firms enter.  
In these models entry is suboptimally slow, in contrast, in our model greater uncertainty 
leads to more entry and exit by firms, except in the case of new products where the 
discovery cost is large.  Like ours, the model of Albornoz et al. (2010) has uncertainty 
about the profitability of a particular market that is revealed when a producer enters a 
market.  However, their focus is on the sequence of entry into new markets and not on 
entry and exit in existing markets and the development of products and markets that are 
new to the country.  Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) offer a model of self-discovery, with 
uncertainty and high costs of starting a new product.  Their model is similar is spirit to 
the entry into new products that we discuss.  However, in their model the threat of 
imitation discourages firms from innovating and that leads to suboptimal discovery.  In 
contrast, we show that discovery costs alone generate similar effects. The literature on 
multi-product firms also explores some of these issues, but it focuses on products or 
markets new to the firm and not to the country.
5   
                                                 
5 The multiproduct firm models do a nice job explaining the efficient use of resources within a firm and 
how a trade shock alters within firm resource allocation, but they cannot explain the discovery of a 
completely new export product or market, one of the things we want to model. (See Nocke and Yeaple 
(2006), Eckel and Neary (2008), Bernard Redding and Schott (2010)).     6
Our theoretical framework is also related to the literature on hysteresis and trade 
flows, which shows that with sunk costs and uncertainty about market conditions, 
positive shocks that lead to entry may not produce exit when they are reversed.
6 In these 
models, only bad market conditions induce exit and hence entry and exit will not be 
positively correlated.  Our departure from these models is that we assume there is 
uncertainty about the firm’s potential in a market. Specifically, export costs are revealed 
only if the firm enters, and the firm can exit if the cost is high. This generates a strong 
positive correlation between entry and exit, a feature confirmed in the data. 
  In sum, our work builds on previous theoretical and empirical developments in 
the literature of exports at the firm-level, but instead of focusing on equilibrium effects, 
we focus on the dynamics of a growing sector.  In particular, the patterns of entry and 
exit of firms in exporting and the discovery of new products and new markets.   
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section develops the model.  Section 
III examines the predictions from the model using transactions level data from customs. 
Section IV offers background information on the nontraditional agriculture exports in 
Peru that supports the findings from the previous section.  Finally, Section V concludes. 
 
II. Model 
  Before developing the model, we use an example to highlight the issues that we 
wish to address.  Consider three entrepreneurs that want to access foreign markets.  Sr. 
Lopez wants to start an export business but he does not know whether the cost of 
exporting will be prohibitive.  He must gather information on regulations and paperwork 
                                                 
6 See Baldwin (1988), Baldwin and Krugman (1989), and Dixit (1989).  Roberts and Tybout (1997) also 
use this framework and find evidence that sunk costs are important in explaining entry into exporting by 
Colombian firms.   7
required for his products to be shipped abroad.  After paying this entry cost, his success 
will depend on the overhead cost of exporting he faces.  Sr. Martinez, an entrepreneur 
already established in foreign markets, wants to break into new markets.  He needs to 
find the right distributor in the new destination and market his products so that they will 
be appealing to his new customers.  Subsequent to this investment, he also faces 
uncertainty in delivery costs that will determine profitability and survival.  Finally, Sra. 
Nuñez is considering how to develop an export product nobody in the country has ever 
sold abroad.  Her decision about whether to invest in product development depends on 
the magnitude of discovery costs and whether another firm has already taken the lead and 
she can save time and money on establishing new production techniques. This model is 
about the collective experience of the many entrepreneurs like these three in their 
attempts to break into foreign markets. 
There are several important features of exporting that we want to capture in the 
model.  First, there are heterogeneous entrepreneurs in terms of ability.  The ability of the 
entrepreneur is related to management skills and technical knowledge.  Second, there is 
idiosyncratic uncertainty—a firm does not know how costly it will be to export a 
particular product to a given market until the firm tries.  Third, there is a sunk cost of 
entry into exporting, reflecting changes to the product, required paperwork, and the 
gathering of market information that must be completed before exporting.  The model is 
meant to be illustrative and highlight the way entrepreneurs behave; it does not take into 
account general equilibrium effects.
7   We first describe the basic model then we discuss 
                                                 
7 We abstract from the precise production function in terms of labor and capital because when we go to the 
data, we will only observe exports.   8
how the model changes if small trials are possible.  Finally, we discuss how the model 
can be adapted to describe entry into new products and new goods. 
 
i.   Basic Model 
  We start with an entrepreneur, of type αi, where α ranges from 0 to 1, and a higher 
α represents a more productive entrepreneur.  It is the amount of product the entrepreneur 
can produce and it is known by him from the beginning. 
In this model, there are two different markets: foreign and domestic. If a product 
is sold in foreign market k (k denotes the product-market combination), the entrepreneur 
receives price Pk, which is known. For example, an entrepreneur can observe the price of 
a specific product in a specific market and knows how much he can produce, thus he has 
a very good estimate of potential revenues from that product-market combination. If the 
product is sold domestically, the entrepreneur charges a price PD.  
Foreign and domestic markets entail distinct costs. An entrepreneur serving the 
foreign market pays a sunk entry cost and a fixed per-period cost of exporting (i.e. a fixed 
overhead cost).  An entrepreneur selling to the domestic market pays only a fixed per-
period cost.  Specifically:  
  Ck is the overhead cost that a firm pays to export to foreign market k.  This cost is 
associated with bureaucracy and logistics. This cost is unknown to the entrepreneur 
before exporting, and it is not revealed until he exports.  The entrepreneur has an 
expectation of what this cost will be before trying to export. Specifically, with 
probability q he gets a low cost draw, Ck
L, and with probability (1-q) he receives a 
high cost draw, Ck
H. 
 
  F is a sunk cost of entry into a foreign market. This is the cost that the entrepreneur 
has to incur to adapt his factory or his land to produce a particular product for export.  
 
  CD is the overhead cost that the entrepreneur pays to serve the domestic market.  
   9
 
We assume that the overhead cost of exporting, Ck, is larger than the cost in the domestic 
market CD. The intuition is that exporting requires the producer to get the product 
through local distribution to the ports as well as through foreign distribution. In addition, 
we assume that for export goods the price in the foreign market, Pk, is larger than the 
price in the domestic sector, PD.
8  Given the higher costs of accessing the foreign market, 
Pk must be greater for the entrepreneur to have incentive to export to that product-market.   
The sequence of decisions to be made by the entrepreneur is the following. First, 
the entrepreneur faces the decision of whether to enter the export sector or the domestic 
sector. If the entrepreneur goes to the domestic sector he earns αi PD and pays CD.  He 
receives profits (αi PD - CD ) for life, discounted at the rate δ.  If the entrepreneur enters 
the export sector, he earns αi Pk and pays the realization of the overhead cost of exporting, 
Ck, plus the sunk cost F in the first period. As noted above, there are two possibilities for 
the cost of exporting: with probability q, the exporter will obtain a low cost, Ck
L
, and with 
probability (1-q), he will obtain a high cost, Ck
H.   
To concentrate on the trade-off that is important in the data, we impose a number 
of regularity conditions on the parameters.  First, we assume that Pk-CH>PD-CD, so that 
exporting is always more interesting than domestic sales on a period-by-period basis for a 
firm with the highest quality. Second, we assume that the sunk cost, F, is small enough 
such that some entrepreneurs attempt exporting even if they may exit ex-post.  
                                                 
8 For Peruvian agricultural exports considered here this is a sensible assumption, in part because Peru 
exports many products when the US and Europe and other northern hemisphere markets are not producing.  
Still, to check we identified four nearly identical products included in the Peruvian and US CPI, oranges, 
tomatoes, (delicious) apples and bananas.  These products are all exported from Peru.  We compared 
monthly prices in $US for one kilogram of each product. On average the US price was 4.5 times higher in 
2008 and 2009, and ranged from 2.8 to 5.3.   10
Specifically, the condition is that there exists an αi, such that expected lifetime profits 
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 , where E(Ck) is the expected 
overhead cost of exporting. Later, in a sub-section (II.iii), we discuss the situation when 
entry costs are large enough to preclude an enter-exit strategy.   
Now, we can solve the model backward. We examine what happens in the second 
period to a firm that entered the export sector in the first period.   The decision is whether 
to stay in or exit the foreign market given the realization of Ck. This will depend on the 
profits from staying versus shifting to the domestic sector. Subsequent to entry, the 
profits from staying in the export sector are 
Profitstay = ), (
1
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  and the profits from exit are 
Profitexit = ). (
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The threshold α, above which firms choose to stay in the export market (αstay), can be 
calculated from comparing exporter profits if he stays in the foreign market forever 
(Profitstay) and profits if he exits the foreign market after one period and goes to the 
domestic sector (Profitexit).  Profitstay must be larger than or equal to Profitexit for the 
entrepreneur to continue exporting.  This implies that the threshold α for staying in the 
export market is 














k ik C C C ,  .  Given the regularity conditions mentioned above, we know that 
αstay is positive. All entrepreneurs with an αi equal to or above this threshold, given the 
realization of their overhead cost, will continue exporting. 
Now, having solved for the cutoff αstay in the second period, we go back to the 
first period and solve for the threshold level of α for the entrepreneur to enter the export 
sector. In order for an entrepreneur to enter the export sector, it must be the case that the 
value of entry exceeds the value of going to the domestic sector.  There are two 
possibilities for entry.  In the first case, an entrepreneur enters and stays in the foreign 
market irrespective of the cost draw.  This is the case for highly productive entrepreneurs, 
those with α always above αstay in Equation 1.  This yields the value function of entry 
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 .  
In the second case, an entrepreneur enters the export sector and stays only if he receives a 
low cost draw —he exits the foreign market if the cost is high.  This is the case for firms 
with α above αstay(C
L) but below αstay(C
H).
9 The value function in this case is 
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   
 
For firms to choose to enter the export sector, the expected value of attempting 
export (Equation 2 or 3, depending on α) must be larger than the value of producing for 
the domestic sector. The value of selling domestically, VDi, is 
(4)  ). (
1
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9 Note that an entrepreneur will never enter and then exit if the cost draw is low.  If the value of entry 
(where cost is unknown) is greater than being in the domestic sector then it must be the case that the value 
of staying with a low cost draw is better than being in the domestic sector since CL<E(Ck).     12
Thus, the cutoff for entry lies at the intersection of Equations (3) (where firms enter and 
stay if the cost draw is low, but exit if the cost draw is high) and (4) (the value of 
domestic production).
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Again, given the regularity conditions mentioned above, this cutoff is positive.  
It is straightforward to show that, given the regularity conditions, αstay(C
H)  is 
above αentry and thus some firms exit in equilibrium (see Annex 4 for proof).  The 
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   . 
The gap described in Equation (7) reflects the range of α for which the enter-exit strategy 
is valid.  It is increasing in the difference between Ck
H and Ck
L; and it is decreasing in the 
difference between Pk and PD and the entry cost. The intuition is that there is an option 
value of exiting if the cost is high. This option value is higher when Ck
H is very high.  
This implies that more uncertainty leads to more exit in equilibrium, all else equal.  
Interestingly, a small difference between Pk and PD leads to a larger range of α between 
entry and staying.  The reason is that when this difference is small, more of the gain from 
the foreign sector is coming from low costs, which is where the uncertainty lies.  A 
higher sunk cost makes entry more costly, so as the entry cost rises the range of α for 
                                                 
10 The intersection of (2) and (4) yields the cutoff for entry applicable to the entrepreneurs that always stay. 
We develop this case later when we explore the effects of having large fixed costs in the model.    13
which there is entry and exit declines. For given q, F, Ck, and Pk, the proportion of exits 
also depends on distribution of α.  
We can represent the decision of the entrepreneur in Figure 1.  The three lines 
represent the value of serving the domestic sector (Equation 4), the value of entering the 
export sector and exiting if the realization of cost is high (Equation 3), and the value of 
staying in the export sector irrespective of the cost (Equation 2). Agents with α above α* 
can profitably produce for the domestic market, while those with an α below α* are not 
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs with α above αentry will enter the export market.  If α is 
between αentry  and αstay the entrepreneur exits in the second period if the cost of exporting 
is high and remains if the cost is low.  Entrepreneurs with α above αstay always find the 
exporting sector more profitable than the domestic sector, irrespective of the realization 
of Ck.    The bold curve represents the entrepreneur’s expected value of producing based 
on his type.
  
  In sum, there are three groups of entrepreneurs: (i) those who do not enter into 
exporting but serve the domestic sector; (ii) those who enter into exporting and stay if 
they get a low Ck but exit the foreign market if they get a high Ck; and (iii) those who 
enter into exporting and continue exporting forever regardless of the type of overhead 
cost they obtain. 
 
ii.  Starting Small 
Next, we consider what happens if firms can enter the export market with only a 
fraction, θk (0<θk<1), of their effort in the foreign sector (and the rest in the domestic 
sector) and expend only a fraction of the entry cost.  The intuition is that instead of   14
adapting a whole field to the export market, an entrepreneur can plant a small plot of 
export crop.  This allows entrepreneurs to test the foreign market, and thus there will be a 
larger range of firms using the enter-exit strategy.
11   
Again, we solve the model backwards.  In the second period, there is a cutoff α 
for the entrepreneurs that always stay in the foreign market. The difference from the basic 
model is that if the firm chooses to remain in the export sector, it must pay the remainder 
of its sunk cost in this period. This cutoff level can be found from the comparison of the 
profit equations in the second period: 
Profitstay = , ) 1 ( ) (
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The cutoff level to stay in the market in the second period is similar to the previous one in 
Equation (1), however, in this case, the cutoff depends on the size of the trial in the first 
period, θk. Smaller trials make staying less likely in the second period because the 
fraction of F that still must be expended rises.  In the first period, the associated value of 
entry is as follows: 
                                                 
11 In a different type of model, with costly search, Rauch and Watson (2003) show that a developed country 
buyer may prefer to start with a small trial if he is uncertain of the developing country firm’s ability to fill a 
large order.  Their model also predicts that small starts are less likely to last as long as large ones.     15
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The first term is the value of getting a good cost draw after starting with a small trial θk.  
In period 2, all resources are moved to the foreign sector and the remainder of the entry 
cost, F, is paid. The second term is the value of getting a bad cost draw.  In this case, the 
entrepreneur shifts all resources to the domestic sector in the second period, and does not 
pay the remainder of the sunk cost, F.  The final term is the return from putting the 
remainder of effort in the domestic sector in the first period, while making a trial in the 
export sector.  The cutoff α for an export attempt will be at the intersection of Equation 
(8) and Equation (4), the value of producing only for the domestic sector.   
Comparing Equations (8) and (4) yields a cutoff level of productivity for entry 
into exporting of 









































    
 . 
If θ can be very small, provided an entrepreneur has positive profits at a low cost, he will 

























  , 
which is exactly the cutoff for entering if a low cost draw is guaranteed (q=1 in Equation 
5).  Relatively low α entrepreneurs will choose to start small since this reduces the entry 
cost that is paid if the cost draw is high.  This expands the region between αentry and αstay.    16
The intuition is that the entrepreneur can discover his cost by making a very costless and 
cheap trial.  For firms that are very good, above αstay, there is no incentive for making a 
small trial because they are always better off in the export sector than in the domestic 




iii.  New Products: Fixed Discovery Cost and Greater Uncertainty 
In this section, we discuss the case of a sunk cost of discovery, as it offers insight 
into entry into new and complex products and new and distant markets.  The rational for 
a discovery cost is that finding a new product requires finding the most productive seed, 
determining the best climate for the product, evaluating irrigation needs, and finding 
someone qualified to manage production.  For accessing a new market it requires meeting 
phytosanitary restrictions, determining necessary logistics (e.g. air temperature while in 
transit for fresh produce), transit times, transit type, and finding a buyer.    
One way of thinking of the discovery cost is as a large entry cost in the model 
above.  In Figure 1, as entry costs rise, the lines representing the value of entry and exit 
and the value of entry and stay shift down.  This squeezes the range of firms that choose 
to enter and then to exit if the cost realization is high.  Eventually, as the fixed cost of 
discovery rises, the enter-exit strategy will be eliminated.  This case is shown in Figure 2.  
The locus of entrepreneur profits is shown by the bold lines:  between α and α* firms 
serve the domestic market and above αenter&stay firms enter the export sector and stay 
permanently.  Thus, all firms that can afford the discovery cost will continue exporting   17
after their cost is revealed.  (And, an extremely high discovery cost can preclude all 
entry.)  
Mathematically, comparing the value of entering the export sector and staying, 
irrespective of the cost draw, Equation (2), with the value of producing for the domestic 
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It is precisely those firms for which the present value of profits (relative to the domestic 
sector) is positive. 
Finally, since the sunk discovery cost will not be there for later entrants, pioneers 
face the decision of whether it is better to enter first or wait for others to enter.  To 
consider the effect, let D be the part of the fixed entry cost that is only required if the 
entrant is among the first in the product or product-market combination.  This adds the 
condition that the entrant will only enter now if it is better than waiting for another firm 
to pay the discovery cost. The value of being a pioneer (assuming the entrant stays 
irrespective of the cost draw) is: 
 (12)  
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The value of waiting, assuming a firm takes the probability, p, that a new product or 
market will be discovered as given,
12 is:
  
                                                 
12 Ideally the probability of discovery should depend on the distribution of αs.  Developing the theory in 
that direction will make the model far more complex without adding important insights.  There is a large 
literature on investment, uncertainty and the release of information that was started by Zeira (1987), Rob 
(1991), and Banerjee (1992).  The trade paper that comes closest to this is Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia   18
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where Ri is the opportunity cost of the effort to start a new product.  It could be the return 
from the domestic sector or the foreign sector (for a given C) and is firm specific.  The 
second term is the present discounted value of investing in a new product in the second 
period, given that one is discovered by another firm in the first period.  The third term is 
the value of waiting in the second period if a new product is not discovered; this happens 
with probability (1-p).  In order for an entrepreneur to choose to start a new product, it 
must be the case that Vpioneer>Vwait, which yields the additional condition: 
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This implies that α is higher for a new product also because there is a value to waiting. 
When the discovery cost, D, is big then this condition is hard to satisfy.  No individual 
firm wants to expend D to find a new product, even if once found it is profitable for all 
exporters.  Similarly, if the opportunity cost of investing in a new product, R, is large then 
α is greater. Provided D is not too small, the cutoff α is increasing in the probability 
because as p goes up the benefit from waiting expands.  Finally, the cutoff rate is 
decreasing in the profitability of the product.  The greater is Pk and the lower is the 
average Ck, the more likely is discovery because the gain from starting the product is 
high.   
                                                                                                                                                 
(2008).  The main insight from this literature is that there will be a suboptimal rate of discovery (or 
technology adoption) because firms would rather wait to invest.     19
After products are discovered and the cost of discovery is no longer relevant there 
will be increased entry, and the cutoff α falls to equation (5).  Because firms are waiting 
for others to expend discovery costs, the rate of discovery is suboptimal.  There can be 
products that can be exported competitively but which are not exported because of the 
high discovery cost a single firm must face. This is the standard problem of innovation.  
If the gains are relatively greater for followers then there is little incentive to innovate. 
This is true even if imitation does not erode the pioneers products, but simply because 
imitation is less costly. 
 In sum, developing new products requires a much larger entry cost, because the 
production process is very different for these products.  Similarly, this may be the case 
for entering distant markets where new standards must be met.  This implies that firms 
that start new products or new markets are likely to be the better firms, and these firms 
are likely to have a lower exit rate than later entrants, all else equal.  If fixed costs of 
discovery are large, after successful products (or markets) are found, there will be 
herding into those markets as such costs fade. 
Several testable predictions come out of the model: 
 
1.  Size and quality.  There is self selection into exporting with high and medium 
productivity entrepreneurs exporting (they are on average more productive than 
the average in the industry).  The highest productivity exporters will enter and 
survive in more products and markets on average, and export more to each 
product-market.    20
2.  Entry and exit patterns.  This model naturally generates entry and exit by the 
same firm.  Exit is especially likely after the first attempt.  This yields a positive 
correlation between entry and exit.  Weaker entrepreneurs (small entrants) are 
more likely to exit.  Weaker firms will enter into exporting with small trials in 
order to avoid high entry costs if they receive a bad cost draw. As a result of entry 
and exit, in the first year of a given cohort, there will be more different quality 
types of firms in the export sector.  This implies that the variation with respect to 
the mean of exporters’ size should decrease with age of the firm.  Many of the 
lower quality exporters will exit, while some that receive a good cost draw will 
expand.   
3.  New products and new markets.  Firms that pioneer new products or new 
markets tend to be high productivity (large) firms, and have a lower exit rate than 
later entrants.  After a product or market is discovered and discovery costs 
disappear, there is more entry (herding). 
 
III. Empirical Evidence from Transactions Data 
In this section, we examine whether the predictions of the model are consistent 
with the Peruvian experience in the nontraditional agricultural sector.  This is a 
particularly dynamic sector (Figure 3), which began a period of rapid growth in the mid 
to late 1990s.  The product that mainly explains this surge is asparagus, but there is also 
considerable growth in the exports of other nontraditional crops (in particular, 
prepared/preserved artichokes, avocados, paprika, grapes and mangos) in recent years 
(Figure 4).     21
Although several factors contributed to the surge,
13 firm entry into exporting and 
the discovery of new products and markets was an important part of the story.  Thus, the 
study of this sector allows us to examine the transition to equilibrium, and in particular 
the export decisions by firms as was explored in the model in the previous section.   
We start by describing the data and then we proceed to explore the predictions 
from the theoretical framework. 
 
i.  Description of the Data 
We use transaction data on Peruvian export flows included within Chapter 7 
(Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers), Chapter 8 (Edible fruit and nuts; peel of 
citrus fruit or melons), Chapter 9 (but only the lines related to the exports of paprika) and 
Chapter 20 (Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts or other parts of plants) of the HS 
Code. Although we have daily information on all shipments between years 1994 and 
2007, for much of the analysis, we report annual results. The dataset allows the 
identification of the exporter (information on firms’ names and corresponding Tax ID 
number), the destination market for each trade flow, the custom port from which the 
merchandise is shipped, the description of the item exported (at 10-digit) and the FOB 
value of each shipment.  
The values exported by year/date of the different products under analysis in this 
study (i.e. asparagus, prepared/preserved artichokes, avocados, mangoes, paprika, grapes, 
                                                 
13  Two important factors that led to large scale investment were land privatization in 1993, which removed 
constraints on the size of plots, and the capture of the head of the Shining Path in 1992, which greatly 
improved investor confidence in rural areas in Peru.  Some additional conditions accelerated this 
investment.  The introduction of the drip irrigation system (imported from Israel) in the late 1980s was 
completed in the late 1990s.  The Andean Trade Preferences Act (then extended under the ATPDEA) 
eliminated the tariffs for the Peruvian exports of asparagus to the United States from 1993. Currently, these 
preferences have been included in the FTA signed between Peru and the United States.   22
etc.) include all the relevant lines and items of the HS code. In the definition of each 
product, we included all those lines related to the exports of each product in its different 
forms/presentations.
14  After collapsing the information by firm, year, market and product 
we obtain 16,053 observations. The summary statistics of the data (by firms, products and 
markets) can be found in Annex 1. The details of all the lines or items included in the 
definition of each product can be found in Annex 2.
15 
  To analyze the model’s predictions, we split the presentation of the evidence up 
into three parts.  The first part focuses on exporting firm characteristics: correlations 
between the number of markets and products and size of firms.  The second part focuses 
on entry and exit of firms into exporting.  The third part focuses on entry into new 
products and markets.  
 
ii.  Characteristics of the Exporters 
This section explores the main characteristics of the exporters in our sample 
relating size across products and markets.   The model suggests that higher quality 
entrepreneurs export more to a given product-market, export to more markets, and export 
more products.  Since we cannot directly estimate firm quality, we examine whether 
                                                 
14 We also proceeded this way to avoid problems associated with changes in the product classification in 
the HS Code in 1996 and 2002. 
15 As part of the data cleaning process, we eliminated trade flows registered under the name of individuals 
that showed erratic patterns (i.e., exports of tiny amounts for one or few years not consecutively registered 
to an individual). These individuals are 579 of a total of 2,676 exporters (see also Annex 1), and on 
average, they represented 1.5% of the yearly total amount exported during 1993 and 2007.  Market 
participants informed us that these are individuals, so-called “gatherers,” who buy from small farms and 
sell on an agricultural exchange.  If we include them in our sample, none of the results change dramatically, 
except that the one-year exits are more extreme.  
In order to avoid the inclusion of export flows that could be related to the export of product samples (we 
observed many erratic flows in very small values), we set a threshold as a filter.  Specifically, we excluded 
exports flows that were less than US$ 1,000 a year, after collapsing by firm, product, market and year. We 
checked the robustness of all of our findings under different scenarios for this threshold (US$50, US$100, 
US$200 and US$500) and found that the substance of all of our results holds.  
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larger exporters export more to a given product-market, export to more markets, and/or 
export more products. 
Figure (5a) plots average exports in the product-markets to which a firm exports 
against average size for the beginning and end of the sample period (1994 and 2007).  It 
shows that the largest firms export more on average to each product-market. In addition, 
we observe that larger firms not only tend to export more of a product to a given market, 
but they also export to more product-markets—if they only export to one product-market 
and grow the picture would be the 45
o line.  Figure (5b) confirms that larger firms export 
more products.   While this fact holds throughout the period, it appears to strengthen over 
time. For instance in 2007, we observe relatively more firms exporting a large number of 
products (above 5) and most of these firms are in the upper half of the distribution of 
firms by size. Similarly, larger firms export to more markets, especially in the last years, 
where we observe that most of the firms exporting to more than 10 markets are located in 
the upper fourth of the distribution by size (Figure 5c).
16 
 
iii. Entry and Exit in Exporting 
This section examines the pattern of entry and exit into exporting across the firms 
in our sample.  The model suggests that we should observe a large number of entries and 
exits, and entries and exits will be positively correlated.  In addition, exit is more likely in 
the first year and among firms that start small (relative to other entrants). 
                                                 
16 In all comparisons, we have evaluated the pattern for each of the years included in the sample and we 
observe the same: larger firms export more products and to more markets and this trend accentuates with 
time. However, we only report the results for years 1994 and 2007 for simplicity in the presentation of the 
results.   24
Figure 6 shows firm entry and exit by year. Entry and exit is common. The 
number of entries and exits has increased throughout the period; however, the entries 
have remained higher than the exits for most of the period analyzed.  Another striking 
result is the correlation between entries and exits (0.87).
17  As we will see below, this can 
be explained by the large number of exits after the first year, thus when entry increases, 
we expect to see exit increase the next year. 
Entries are very important in terms of the development of the industry. Figure 7 
shows the cumulative market share in 2007 by cohort in the traditional and nontraditional 
agricultural sectors.
18  Firms that enter during the period under analysis in the 
nontraditional products make up nearly three quarters of exports by 2007.  This differs 
from what is observed in traditional products where entries are important but to a lesser 
degree, making up just over 50 percent of exports by the end of the period. Although 
entries’ importance in both sectors is similar during the first years in our sample, after 
1998, importance of entries in traditional products begins to lag behind relative to 
nontraditional products. This is consistent with the take-off observed in the nontraditional 
sector, which begins in 1998, as shown in Figure 3. In fact, many of the entries that occur 
in the nontraditional products correspond to large and growing firms. In particular, the 
strongest entries happened in 1998, 1999, and 2001 with firms that combined 
                                                 
17 An observation is considered an entry if a firm was not exporting in the previous year.  It is considered an 
exit if it disappears in the next year.  
18 More complete set of statistics by cohort (in terms of the number of firms, the total and average value 
they represent) can be found in Annex 3. The products (and their respective HS codes) considered within 
the group of “traditional” exports are (as classified by the Central Bank of Peru):  
- Cotton (5201/5202) 
- Coffee (0901) 
- Sugar and molasses (1701/1703) 
- Wool (5101/5102/5103/5104) 
- Raw hides (pieles) (4101/4102/4103) 
- Coca leaves (1211300000) 
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concentrated one-third of the market in 2007. These strong entries corresponded to 
Sociedad Agricola Drokasa in 1998, Camposol in 1999 –two of the largest exporters- and 
a Consortium of fruit producers in 2001.
19  
Figure 8 presents the average number of exits according to the age of the 
exporting spell. We observe a drastic decrease in the average number of exits after the 
first year of exporting. In particular, we observe that in 667 exporting attempts, exporters 
cease to export after their first year of operation. Then, for spells that lasted at least two 
years, on average, only 271 came to an end after their second year of operations.   
If we translate the exits into the fail rate by age group (Figure 8b), we observe that 
the decrease in the fail rate remains, although it is less abrupt.  For instance, a one-year 
old spell has a 34% probability of failure (exiting the market), a two-year old spell has a 
27% chance of failure. This declining trend continues as the attempts last longer.  
Who are these exits?  A large part of them are occasional exporters that try with 
only one shipment. Figure 9 shows the distribution of the annual number of shipments 
exported by firms that lasted only one year. Fifty-six percent of these single-year firms 
exported only one shipment.
20  
In addition, the model suggests that lower quality entrepreneurs are more likely to 
exit. To examine this hypothesis, we develop a binary variable for the entrants that is one 
if the firm exited after one year.  We expect exits to occur more frequently among low 
                                                 
19 According to the export transaction data from SUNAT, Camposol exported for the first time using that 
name in 2002. However, based on information obtained from the company's website and during an 
interview with a representative of the company, we observed that Camposol started to export in 1999 under 
the name of Sol Produce (and a different id number), previous name of the company and one of the brand 
names that the company uses today for its exports of packed asparagus. We took note of that fact and we 
combined the export transaction data from both companies and treated them as one under the name of 
Camposol. 
20 We made a similar calculation for the group of individuals with single-year entries and obtained an even 
larger percent: 60% of the individuals that lasted one year exported only one shipment.   26
quality entrepreneurs.  Low quality entrepreneurs are also likely to start with smaller 
exports, so as to extend a small share of the fixed entry cost.  In Table 1, we report results 
from a Probit regression of exit after one year on the log value of exports during the 
initial entry, controlling for crop, market and year (Column 1) –results from a similar 
regression using OLS are reported in Column 2.  We find a robust negative relationship, 
indicating that a ten percent larger entry is associated with about a 1 percent lower 
likelihood of exit. However, we know that many of these exits occur after the initial 
shipment.  Therefore, firms may all start with similar size shipments, with some firms 
exiting after one shipment while others continue.  This would generate a negative 
relationship between size and exit in the annual data, but only because firms that exit 
have fewer shipments.  To control for this possibility, we also regress exit on the log 
value of the initial shipment exported by each firm (Column 3) –results from a similar 
regression using OLS are reported in Column 4.
21  We find that a ten percent larger initial 
shipment is associated with a 0.3 percent lower chance of exiting the market after the first 
year.  The smaller coefficient suggests that part of what is driving the coefficient at the 
annual level is variation in the number of shipments. 
Frequent entry and exit imply that the sunk costs to entry into exporting are not 
large. In addition to the high number of entries and exits observed in the data, additional 
evidence of the presence of small sunk costs (for the entry into exporting) is the observed 
pattern of re-entry of some firms in our sample. Not all firms enter and exit exporting 
only once.  There are 194 firms (almost 10% of the total number of firms, excluding 
individuals, in our sample) that reenter after a few years (see also Annex 1).  This is not 
consistent with very high sunk costs on entry. 
                                                 
21 We also tried Logit and results are similar, not reported.   27
Finally, we examine the distribution of the size of firms as they age.  In Figure 10 
we present the residuals from a regression of size on age, controlling for main product 
exported and year. In the Figure 10a we observe that the variation in the residuals among 
firms declines significantly as they age. Also, we analyze the distribution of these 
residuals in two different ages (Figure 10b) and we confirm that there is less dispersion 
among firms as they age from their first year to their ninth. This is consistent with weak 
firms with high cost draws exiting and weak firms with low cost draws expanding.   
In sum, we observe considerable entry and exit of exporters each year; they are 
positively correlated; exit is especially likely after the first year and among firms that 
start small; there is less variation in terms of size as firms grow older; entry is important, 
accounting for two-thirds of total exports in 2007.  All of these findings are consistent 
with the model, where entry and exit are a form of trial and error, and initial sunk costs 
are not very high. 
 
iv.  Innovation:  The Discovery of New Products and New Markets 
This section examines which exporters (by size and experience) are the first to 
enter new products and new product-markets (defined at the country level).  Once they 
enter new products and markets, we also examine the development of the industry.  The 
model suggests that, when sunk discovery costs are high, larger exporters will be more 
likely to start new products (or markets), that they will be more successful in surviving in 
the export of these new products (or new markets) and that there will be herding after 
successful products (or markets) are discovered.     28
A product is defined as “new” in our sample if the product was not exported from 
Peru in 1994 (the first year of our sample) and was later exported for at least four years 
consecutively at any time within our sample.
22 A product is defined as “old” if it was 
exported for at least for two years consecutively starting in 1994.  All cases not covered 
by these definitions are either intermittent products or products that were exported only 
once in our sample. In these cases, we dub these products “trials”, unless exports are 
either left or right censored.  
New markets are defined at the product level, in a similar fashion.  Specifically, a 
product-market combination is “new” if it was not served in 1994 and then was later 
covered for at least four consecutive years.  A product-market combination is defined as 
“old” if it was covered consecutively for at least two years starting in 1994.  And cases 
not covered by the types described above are either intermittent product-market 
combinations or product-markets that have been covered only once according to our 
sample. In these cases, we define product-markets as “trials”, with the exception of 
product-markets whose coverage is left or right censored.  
Using these definitions, exports of new products made up 12 percent of the value 
of exports in 2007, and exports of old products to new markets made up 16 percent of 
exports. Thus, without these discoveries, growth would have been significantly slower. 
Table 2 shows the distribution of the various types of products and product-
markets over the sample period.  New products make up 20 percent of the total number of 
products that are exported and new product-market combinations are 25 percent of the 
total number of product-markets served.  An important difference between products and 
                                                 
22 We excluded from this group the products that never exceeded a total amount exported of US$10,000 in 
any of the years included in the sample. The only products excluded for this reason are “carrots, turnips & 
other edible roots, frozen or chilled” (all grouped under HS codes 0706).   29
markets is the amount of trials.  Market trials are commonplace, with 496 new market 
attempts in specific products, or 62 percent of the total number of product-market 
combinations served in the sample period being trials, i.e. unsuccessful.  In contrast, in 
products there are 10 trials, which amount to only 17 percent of the observations.  Thus, 
the data indicate trials are much more likely in markets, suggestive of lower fixed entry 
costs. 
One caveat is that this could be related to the number of possible trials.  
Specifically, the universe of potential new products (the number of HS 6-digit lines) is 
significantly smaller than the universe of potential new product-markets (the number of 
HS 6-digit lines multiplied by the total number of markets/countries). As an alternative, 
which does not suffer from this potential bias, we compare the success rate of trials in 
both products and markets.  As the model shows, a higher entry cost should yield a higher 
success rate, as only really good firms will try. We find that the success rate in products 
(55 percent) is significantly higher than the rate observed for markets (29 percent), which 
also points toward entry costs into new markets for existing products being relatively 
low.  
Table 3 presents the statistics on the characteristics of entrants
23 in all the 
products that can be considered “new” in the sample from 1994 to 2007. If entry costs are 
high, we expect pioneers to be the better (larger) and more experienced firms.  For 
pioneers in goods that are produced for export but are not consumed locally (“untasted” 
in the country), we expect stronger results as these are likely to involve the largest 
discovery costs.   
                                                 
23 Entrants are defined as all firms exporting in the first three years of the lifecycle of a specific product.   30
Column (1) shows the total number of firms that started to export each new 
product.  Column (2) presents the exporters with previous experience as a share of the 
total number of entrants. In 68 percent of the cases, entrants are exporters with previous 
experience.  The entrants in products belonging to the primarily for export (X) category 
are on average, more experienced than the entrants in goods that are produced for 
domestic consumption (D)—specifically, 76 percent of X exporters have experience, as 
compared with 56 percent of D exporters.
24  Column (3) shows average value of the 
exports in the main product in the previous period relative to the exports of the average 
exporter in that product (mainly to observe the size of the entrants relative to their main 
competitors).  Exporters that start new products tend to be larger on average by about 24 
percent. However, if we decompose this in terms of the products that belong to each 
categories (D and X), we observe that the entrants in the X category are on average 59 
percent larger than their main competitors, while entrants in the D group are not 
necessarily the larger exporters in the year previous to their entry. This last observation 
could be due to the fact that the exporters in this group compete mainly with producers in 
the domestic sector, which are likely to be smaller but are not taken into account in the 
average calculated for exporters since we do not have information on their size.  Column 
(4) shows the average ratio of the count of products exported by the entrants over the 
average number of products exported by all the firms whose main product exported was 
the same as the entrant’s main product during the year of entry into the new product. The 
                                                 
24 The D category refers to the new export goods for which there is a demand in the domestic market. The X 
category includes new export goods that are mainly produced for exportation. The grouping of new goods 
in terms of these two categories was based on information on domestic demand obtained from the Ministry 
of Agriculture (mainly for fresh produce), the National Institute of Statistics and the website of a 
supermarket (E.Wong). 
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ratios above one show that, on average, the entrants export more products than their main 
competitors. In all cases, the entrants export more products than their average competitor; 
however, again, this ratio is larger for the entrants in products of the X category. 
In addition, differences are observed between fresh produce and processed 
produce.  The new products with more entrants are mostly products in the segment of 
fresh produce (avocado, passion fruit, piquillo pepper, etc.), suggesting that discovery 
may be easier in these products.  
Overall, these results imply that exporters of new products tend to be bigger, 
export more products, and be experienced exporters, and these results are particularly 
important for products that are “untasted” in the country, where discovery is likely to be 
more costly. 
Given that in the case of the pioneers in product-markets combinations, we have a 
larger sample (1,767 observations), we use regression analysis to complement the 
analysis of the characteristics of the entrants into new markets presented above.
25  We 
create a dependent variable that is one if a firm is a pioneer in a product-market and zero 
if the firm is a late entrant into that product-market.  We regress that on the size in the 
year before entry, experience in the product, and experience in the market (an indicator 
that is one if the firm served that product or market previously).  Table 4 presents the 
results. Using Probit, we find that entrants into new product-market combinations are 
relatively large exporters (the coefficient of the size of the exporter in t-1 is positive and 
significant). Experience exporting the same product is positively and significantly 
                                                 
25 Again entrants are defined in terms of the firms that started to export during the first three years in the 
lifecycle of a particular new product-market combination. Here we make no distinction between products 
that are consumed domestically and products that are mainly exported because the focus in this part is on 
the discovery of markets “new” to the exporters in a particular product regardless of the type of product 
involved in the transaction.   32
correlated with pioneering new product-markets. Past experience in the same market is 
never significant. These results hold using OLS as well.  This suggests that firms that 
pioneer new markets have experience exporting the product to other markets and they 
tend to be larger than other firms. 
Another feature suggested by the theory is that the pioneering firms must be 
higher quality if fixed costs of discovery are large.  This suggests that pioneering firms 
are more likely to survive than followers.  Table (5) shows the average one-year survival 
rates in new products and new product-markets for the group of pioneers and followers.  
On average, pioneers always survive longer than followers. The difference between the 
survival rate of pioneers and followers is larger in the case of the products that are mainly 
exported. Again, this implies that these products are the most difficult to develop.  There 
is also a difference in survival rates of pioneers in new products and in new markets.  The 
difference between the survival rate of pioneers in new products and of pioneers in new 
markets is positive. In contrast, the followers in both types have similar rates of survival.  
This offers additional evidence that the discovery costs of new products are higher than 
the discovery costs of finding new markets for an existing export product. To enter into 
new products, exporters need to be of very high productivity and thus are quite likely to 
survive, while to enter into new product-markets, the cutoff productivity level is 
somewhat lower.   
Finally, if discovery costs are large, we should observe herding after successful 
entry, when other firms can imitate this success without paying large sunk discovery 
costs.    We now examine the pattern of imitation.  Figure (11a) shows the mean and 
median of entry in new products (D and X) over the lifecycle of the new products.  We   33
observe increasing entry a few years after discovery in the case of new products (both 
type D and X).  Figure 11b shows a similar picture for new product-markets.  Herding is 
less obvious: while the mean of entries increases over time, the median remains almost 
flat from the fourth year onwards and the scale is much smaller.  Again, this suggests that 
the entry costs to new product-markets are not as high as the costs of discovering of new 
products, therefore, the role of the pioneers in new markets is not as strong as it is in the 
case of new products.  
The imitation that takes place in the case of new products could be the result of a 
product becoming more attractive—i.e. an increasing foreign price.  Figure 12 shows the 
mean and median of unit values in the products.  Peru appears to be largely a price taker.  
Thus, the increased entry appears to be the result of following the pioneers into the 
product rather than expanding foreign demand. 
In sum, we find limited evidence that sunk costs of discovering new markets 
discourage entry, and strong evidence that sunk costs of discovering new products 
discourage entry (especially in the case of products that are produced mainly for 
exportation). Both entrants in new products and new markets tend to be relatively large 
and more experienced.  However, while trials are very common in new product-markets, 
they are very rare in new products.  Also, the rate of success of entrants relative to 
followers is greater for products as compared with new product-markets, however, within 
products, this difference is greater in the case of entrants in products not consumed in 
Peru.  We observe herding after entry in new products but not new markets.  These 
results, taken with the results from the previous section imply that if there is a role for 
policy to stimulate entry, it is in new products where entry is rare.  And it is especially   34
important in the case of products produced for exportation. The role for policy is much 
less for entry into exporting or into new markets.  In the next section, we discuss 
anecdotal evidence on the discovery of new products that confirms that entry was in fact 
costly into many new products. 
 
IV. Anecdotal Evidence on Product Discovery in Peru 
The empirical work above suggests that discovering new products is costly, but 
once products are discovered imitation is relatively straightforward.  Below, we describe 
briefly the story behind the development of the asparagus industry—the main Peruvian 
nontraditional crop—and then explain the discovery of other new crops.  This anecdotal 
evidence offers further support for the presence of high discovery costs of new products. 
 
i.   The Development of the Asparagus Industry 
Asparagus is the most important nontraditional crop.  It was not consumed locally 
when it was first developed, and its exports began with direct market intervention.  The 
production of asparagus started in the 1950’s in the valleys of the North coast of Peru, 
with exports of canned white asparagus. The expansion into fresh asparagus was due to 
an experiment in the south of Lima, involving both the private sector and assistance from 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The Ica Farmers’ Association 
decided to explore options to replace traditional crops with export crops. With funding 
from USAID, many products were studied for this purpose (melons, paprika, green beans 
and asparagus); the one with the most profit potential was asparagus (Shimizu 2006). As 
a result, a new variety of seed designed for Peru (UC-157, created by an expert from the   35
University of California, Davis) was introduced successfully. USAID also provided 
funding for experts who advised on crop management, packing, and exporting. Fresh 
asparagus was first exported at the end of the 1980s, and in 2002 exports of fresh 
asparagus surpassed exports of canned asparagus.  This highlights the potential role for 
intervention in finding new products.  Next we turn to other more recent discoveries. 
 
ii.   The Development of Other New Crops  
Recent and rapidly growing export crops, include among others, preserved 
artichoke and paprika. Like asparagus, both of these are not consumed domestically. 
The case of artichokes is especially interesting and provides evidence on the 
importance of sunk costs of discovery, and how networks and coordination help firms to 
overcome them.  Artichoke exports were first attempted by the large asparagus firms.  
Several trial plots for artichokes were developed independently–according to different 
sector participants.  However, the trials were costly and the farmers ultimately gave up.  
A seed distributor (Mr. Fumagalli) heard of these trials, studied the market for artichoke 
seeds and invited the exporters to present this information. As a result of this meeting, 
many of the attendees decided to conduct a large coordinated effort.  The advantage was 
that they could try many seed varieties, climates, and irrigation techniques and share 
information on what was most efficient.  This culminated in the takeoff of the exports of 
preserved artichokes; the trials revealed that the climate was inappropriate for fresh 
artichokes (Klinger 2007). 
The case of paprika is a case of pure private entrepreneurship. It was the initiative 
of a seed distributor (Mr. Chepote) who learned of paprika through a friend in Chile and   36
decided to try it in Peru. He formed a company that produced and exported paprika.  
They were successful on a small scale and with the help of Spanish investment expanded 
significantly.  After the expansion was complete, a virus destroyed the whole crop and 
Mr. Chepote had to close down.  However, due to the original success of paprika, Mr. 
Chepote marketed his knowledge to other producers and the exports of paprika took off 
(Klinger 2007). 
These stories show that the way Peruvian exporters decide to try new varieties is 
typically based on extensive research and development and in some cases market 
intervention or coordination.  This evidence on what are now some of the biggest crops in 
Peru in combination with the empirical results above imply that discovering new products 
involves sizeable sunk costs.  This suggests that there is a role for facilitating 
coordination among producers and subsidizing research.    
 
V. Conclusion  
We examine the development of nontraditional agriculture exports in Peru.  Our 
theoretical framework assumes that there is idiosyncratic uncertainty about the 
profitability of exporting and that there are sunk costs of entry—this leads to a process of 
trial and error (observed in the industry), with a high share of exits after one year.   Many 
firms start with small trials and increase their exports over time, in this way avoiding 
losses from potentially uncompetitive products.   Entrepreneurs in large firms export 
more to a given product-market pair on average, enter more markets and more products, 
and enter new markets and products earlier.  Because they are relatively high quality they 
survive in new products and new markets at a higher rate than subsequent entrants.  
These predictions are confirmed in the data.     37
   The results highlight significant differences between entry into exporting, entry 
into new markets, and entry into new product lines.  The large amount of entry and exit in 
exporting that we uncover, suggests that entry costs are not so large as to deter entry.  As 
the model shows, this is true provided firms can enter small and sunk costs are not too 
large relative to lifetime gains.  This appears to be the case for firm entry into existing 
products and existing markets.  Firms entering new markets with old products face 
somewhat higher costs of entry, but still, the large amount of trial and error suggests that 
they are not excessive.  However, completely new products are different.  They are costly 
to introduce, which deters entry, especially since followers do not have to pay discovery 
costs.  Firms that discover new products are larger and more likely to succeed than 
followers.  There are few new product trials and there is herding after products are 
discovered.   
We also examine separately export discoveries of products new to the country that 
are not consumed locally.  By definition these are products in which local producers have 
no initial expertise.  There is no home market effect, and more productive domestic firms 
do not become exporters.  Rather these are export products that entrepreneurs invest both 
time and money to develop.  Theory suggests that only the highest quality entrepreneurs 
will discover such goods.  Indeed, we find that entrepreneurs in these products are better 
(larger, more experienced, higher survival rate) than other types of pioneers in new 
goods, and that entry rates into such products are lower.  In addition, there is herding 
after product discovery, implying that the cost of imitation is lower than of discovery.   
Our results imply that the rate of new product discovery is likely to be 
suboptimal, and therefore there is a role for government policy targeting the discovery of   38
new products.  In Peru, in the early stages of the development of nontraditional exports, 
one form of government assistance was subsidizing producer-exporter associations (Diaz 
2007).  For example, IPEH, which promotes exports and competitiveness in asparagus 
and other nontraditional vegetables, was formed with government assistance (O’Brien and 
Diaz 2004).  An important indication of its success is that it is now funded entirely by the 
private sector.  Similarly, Volpe Martincus and Carballo (2008) find evidence that the 
main export promotion agency, PROMPEX, has helped stimulate exports more generally.  
More research into how to assist export discovery in developing countries, without 
introducing costly distortions, is warranted.   39
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Figure 1: The Value of Exporting and the Type of Entrepreneur 
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Figure 5: Size versus products and markets 
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Figure 8: Exits of firms by age 
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Figure 10: Distribution of the size of the firms by age 
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Figure 11: Entries after Discovery 
 
a)  In new products 
 
 
b)  In new product-markets 
 












































Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10
Mean Median  48
Table 1: Probit Regression on Probability of Exit 
 










(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(initial exports) -0.14*** -0.12***
[0.010] [0.01]
ln (first shipment value) -0.03*** -0.03***
[0.010] [0.01]
Observations 1370 1397 1370 1397
Product Yes Yes Yes Yes
M a r k e t Y e sY e sY e sY e s
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in brackets




Number % Number %
New (a) 201 24.94 12 20.00
Old (b) 109 13.52 38 63.33
Trials (c)  496 61.54 10 16.67


















(1) (2) (3) (4)
Avocadoes 19 37% 0.78 1.30
Guanabana Juice 2 100% 1.56 1.47
Mango Juice 7 71% 0.64 1.04
Passion Fruit 7 71% 0.81 2.11
Pinneaples 2 0% 0.00 2.33
Average (D) 7 56% 0.76 1.65
Prepared/preserved Artichoke 7 100% 3.03 1.71
Prepared/preserved Mango 4 100% 1.42 2.30
Prepared/preserved Nuts 2 50% 0.02 1.00
Prepared/preserved Papaya 2 100% 1.16 3.38
Prepared/preserved Sweet Corn 4 50% 3.44 2.28
Papaya Juice 1 100% 0.92 1.00
Piquillo Pepper 9 33% 1.14 1.54
Average (X) 4 76% 1.59 1.89











Table 5: Average survival rates after one year, in new products and new product-








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln (total exports in t‐1) 0.029* 0.0243* 0.0113*** 0.008*
(0.02)        (0.01)        (0.00)          (0.00)         
Past experience in same product 0.099*** 0.152** 0.059*** 0.077***
(0.03)        (0.07)        (0.02)          (0.03)         
Past experience in same market 0.03 0.02 0.028 0.020
(0.03)        (0.05)        (0.02)        (0.03)         
Observations 734           1,152       1,152       734           1,128         1,767         1,767       1,128        













Difference in Survival Rate: 8.53 2.38  50
Annex 1: Summary statistics of the data 
 















1994 567 140,069,787        
1995 620 169,345,874        
1996 613 202,059,329        
1997 652 208,153,040        
1998 583 198,863,592        
1999 782 263,332,652        
2000 1,064 250,119,272        
2001 1,050 304,436,362        
2002 1,183 371,673,187        
2003 1,297 438,881,446        
2004 1,530 562,062,708        
2005 1,744 726,224,496        
2006 2,046 884,797,308        
2007 2,322 1,101,137,051     
Total 16,053
Non single‐year exp. Single‐year exporters Total
Non individuals 1,272 825 2,097
Individuals 239 340 579
Total 1,511 1,165 2,676
Exporters non‐rentry Exporters with re‐entry Total
Non individuals 1,903 194 2,097
Individuals 536 43 579
Total 2,439 237 2,676  51
 

















1994 210 666,999                  1,311,441                  1,265                           8,686,215                          
1995 221 766,271                  1,581,295                  1,018                           11,918,041                       
1996 239 845,437                  1,933,473                  1,000                           17,818,464                       
1997 225 925,125                  2,325,943                  1,006                           24,140,284                       
1998 203 979,624                  2,593,879                  1,920                           24,164,342                       
1999 267 986,265                  2,659,069                  1,013                           23,044,694                       
2000 307 814,721                  2,317,083                  1,048                           23,325,820                       
2001 351 867,340                  2,406,457                  1,000                           23,349,340                       
2002 392 948,146                  2,774,388                  1,004                           29,665,694                       
2003 432 1,015,929              3,453,340                  1,058                           47,235,336                       
2004 468 1,200,989              4,099,953                  1,001                           61,607,304                       
2005 540 1,344,860              4,758,673                  1,008                           76,113,736                       
2006 595 1,487,054              5,999,261                  1,207                           97,699,096                       








1994 42 3,334,995                  9,959,187                  1,042                           61,421,740               
1995 48 3,528,039                  11,752,034                1,050                           77,926,088               
1996 44 4,592,258                  14,655,546                4,098                           93,610,584               
1997 40 5,203,826                  14,749,356                2,212                           88,928,112               
1998 39 5,099,067                  13,837,446                6,150                           79,323,688               
1999 47 5,602,823                  14,825,945                1,254                           87,683,368               
2000 47 5,321,687                  14,115,093                1,100                           80,498,160               
2001 50 6,088,727                  14,907,061                1,040                           80,892,736               
2002 46 8,079,852                  19,334,110                1,137                           99,071,856               
2003 50 8,777,629                  21,354,464                1,210                           123,434,096             
2004 48 11,700,000                26,273,140                1,017                           156,307,728             
2005 49 14,800,000                31,484,366                2,883                           179,588,880             
2006 53 16,700,000                35,586,412                1,227                           212,422,752             
2007 58 19,000,000                42,798,808                1,114                           259,384,112               52










1994 45 3,112,662                  13,800,000                1,265                           89,960,888     
1995 47 3,603,104                  16,500,000                13,650                        108,818,136  
1996 48 4,209,570                  19,800,000                2,100                           131,603,600  
1997 52 4,002,943                  19,200,000                7,313                           131,696,648  
1998 41 4,850,332                  19,300,000                1,605                           110,707,712  
1999 50 5,266,653                  23,100,000                1,013                           137,202,016  
2000 54 4,631,839                  20,800,000                3,500                           132,834,520  
2001 48 6,342,424                  26,900,000                2,880                           151,131,312  
2002 59 6,299,546                  29,900,000                3,831                           181,650,688  
2003 59 7,438,669                  36,000,000                1,016                           226,051,696  
2004 67 8,388,996                  42,900,000                1,238                           268,860,672  
2005 74 9,813,845                  51,400,000                1,227                           321,110,624  
2006 78 11,300,000                61,900,000                1,904                           398,428,704  
2007 76 14,500,000                76,400,000                4,120                           511,210,848    53
Annex 2: Product classification 
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 Annex 3: Summary statistics of exports and entries by cohort 
 
Cohort1994 Cohort1995 Cohort1996 Cohort1997 Cohort1998 Cohort1999 Cohort2000 Cohort2001 Cohort2002 Cohort2003 Cohort2004 Cohort2005 Cohort2006 Cohort2007 Total
1994 210                   ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                    ‐                  ‐                    ‐                    ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  214                  
1995 133                   88                   ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                    ‐                  ‐                    ‐                    ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  220                  
1996 108                   47                   84                   ‐                  ‐                  ‐                    ‐                  ‐                    ‐                    ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  237                  
1997 85                      29                   44                   67                   ‐                  ‐                    ‐                  ‐                    ‐                    ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  218                  
1998 64                      18                   24                   38                   59                   ‐                    ‐                  ‐                    ‐                    ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  198                  
1999 60                      18                   23                   34                   42                   90                      ‐                  ‐                    ‐                    ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  260                  
2000 53                      13                   23                   30                   31                   52                      105                 ‐                    ‐                    ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  288                  
2001 45                      12                   13                   24                   27                   42                      57                   131                   ‐                    ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  324                  
2002 44                      12                   15                   17                   21                   35                      41                   85                      122                   ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  367                  
2003 39                      13                   16                   15                   19                   28                      33                   61                      66                      142                 ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  399                  
2004 38                      13                   15                   13                   15                   19                      32                   47                      46                      88                   142                 ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  429                  
2005 38                      12                   15                   9                      15                   16                      28                   48                      41                      63                   85                   170                 ‐                  ‐                  464                  
2006 36                      11                   16                   11                   10                   18                      25                   43                      30                      46                   57                   95                   197                 ‐                  539                  
2007 36                      10                   12                   8                      8                      18                      23                   42                      27                      42                   39                   80                   106                 192                 593                  
Cohort1994 Cohort1995 Cohort1996 Cohort1997 Cohort1998 Cohort1999 Cohort2000 Cohort2001 Cohort2002 Cohort2003 Cohort2004 Cohort2005 Cohort2006 Cohort2007 Total
1994 140,100,000  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                    ‐                  ‐                    ‐                    ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  140,100,000     
1995 159,900,000   9,426,866     ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                    ‐                  ‐                    ‐                    ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  169,274,226     
1996 172,500,000   15,552,607   14,056,445  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                    ‐                  ‐                    ‐                    ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  201,974,201     
1997 159,500,000   10,834,199   21,587,571   16,273,075  ‐                  ‐                    ‐                  ‐                    ‐                    ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  206,203,057     
1998 148,500,000   8,930,792     10,056,849   17,152,844   14,222,079  ‐                    ‐                  ‐                    ‐                    ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  197,966,429     
1999 178,400,000   8,838,484     12,977,285   20,885,127   26,528,712   15,656,570     ‐                  ‐                    ‐                    ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  260,408,235     
2000 141,700,000   7,447,453     13,075,186   16,950,109   27,906,561   28,077,101     14,956,075  ‐                    ‐                    ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  244,266,281     
2001 132,800,000   8,286,807     13,955,155   13,445,579   39,147,358   47,488,972     23,251,201   26,050,653     ‐                    ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  288,865,162     
2002 142,800,000   8,984,371     18,310,625   12,548,193   51,868,733   52,043,031     23,072,951   39,325,798     22,748,088     ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  352,305,389     
2003 148,100,000   10,445,214   20,777,208   12,753,798   54,739,189   70,272,676     25,328,759   45,433,146     28,756,004     22,257,925  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  416,093,798     
2004 167,300,000   11,482,384   24,536,344   11,923,248   57,495,428   88,773,745     35,677,086   62,503,635     39,772,636     41,634,382   20,983,038  ‐                  ‐                  ‐                  511,921,373     
2005 196,700,000   15,699,955   28,494,756   13,700,013   80,100,001   107,200,000   50,322,894   78,511,288     40,180,376     47,358,004   38,982,921   28,984,573  ‐                  ‐                  630,712,166     
2006 256,200,000   17,504,631   29,462,398   13,803,093   89,073,786   134,500,000   52,399,298   86,320,778     42,943,540     46,239,579   33,174,894   47,672,319   35,426,928  ‐                  812,001,938     
2007 295,000,000   16,614,316   29,169,730   18,109,317   94,163,165   161,100,000   58,690,569   103,900,000   56,546,712     57,807,309   42,251,032   56,689,385   56,457,480   54,595,331   1,001,945,518  
Exports of Non - Traditional Agricultural products by cohorts (number of firms)
Exports of Non - Traditional Agricultural products by cohorts (total values)  56
Annex 4: Mathematical Appendix,  
 



































F C C q q
F
q





C C q C q q
q













































































































The regularity condition on price ensures the denominator in Equation (6) is 




( D D i
H
k i















ensures the numerator is positive. 
To see this, multiply both sides of the second condition by 1/(1-δ) and subtract the left 
side from the left side of the first condition and the right side from the right side of the 
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 ). Substituting qCL+(1-q)CH for E(C) 










 . Note that some firms with expected lifetime 
profits from exporting (net of fixed cost) below zero will chose to enter because of the 
option of exit. The expected present value of net profits is 
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which is negative given the regularity condition. 
 
 
 